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Orbital Debris Services, Code 592
Research Opportunities
• Drag Enhancement Device Collision Probability
• Postmission Attitude Effects on Drag
• Safe and Reliable Power System Passivation Options
• Safe and Effective Bipropellant Passivation Options
• Pressurant Venting Options for EOM Passivation
• Small Object Penetration Failure Criteria
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Drag Enhancement Device 
Collision Probability
• Drag enhancement is clearly effective for reducing the 
orbital lifetime of retired vehicles
• Can be used to meet the ‘25 year rule’
– Could enable high altitude CubeSats to meet guidelines
• What is the effect on the overall collision probability?
– Shorter orbital time, but larger area
– Random collision with large objects
– Potential to break up 1 – 10 cm objects, creating more debris
• Trends over altitude range, inclination, device size, etc
• Software-driven experiments (relatively low cost)
• Documentation could help to justify adoption of these 
devices
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Postmission Attitude Effects on Drag
• Orbital lifetime estimates are strongly driven by the 
drag area, which is in turn driven by attitude
– Important design assessment for ‘25 year rule’ compliance
• When Attitude Control Subsystem is passivated, 
natural forces dominate
– Gravity gradient vs. drag
– Moments of Inertia vs. ballistic coefficient
– Eventually the spacecraft tumbles, but when?
• Driving factors need to be studied specific to EOM
• Assessment tool development for estimating transition 
to tumble and resulting orbital lifetime
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Safe and Reliable 
Power System Passivation Options
• Power systems should be passivated for reasons 
beyond preventing battery explosion
• Designers are reluctant to design in that capability
– Creates a potential single point of failure
– May allow accidental premature end of mission
– Legacy designs without that capability
• Options can be identified and published
– Disabling solar array input power to the spacecraft
– Disabling battery charging
– Demonstrate the need
• Study the challenges of intermittent charging at EOM
– Spacecraft left power-negative except when arrays are 
illuminated
– Spacecraft is effectively power-cycled as it rotates
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Safe and Effective 
Bipropellant Passivation Options
• Incompletely passivated bipropellant propulsion 
systems have the potential to explode after the 
mission
– Residual amounts of fuel and oxidizer remain, under pressure
– Any leak that allows them to contact can cause explosion
– Vehicles can be left above GEO for centuries
• Options need to be developed to exhaust propellants 
safely after the mission
• Complications
– Varying pressure conditions; potential for backflow
– Thruster valves usually actuate both sides together
– Launch vehicles use pre-loaded commands
– Isolated pressurant prevents ‘flushing’ with the inert gas
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Pressurant Venting Options 
for EOM Passivation
• Residual pressurant leaves tanks under stress
– More susceptible to rupture on MMOD impact
– Very long term tank stability is unknown (GEO = centuries)
– Diaphragm propellant tanks or isolated pressurant tanks
• Designs for venting are not complex, but designers 
are reluctant to incorporate them
• Demonstrate the need for passivation
• Demonstrate the safety of the designs
• Study and report the costs in terms of mass and 
reliability
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Small Object Penetration 
Failure Criteria
• Little is known about the failure criteria for MMOD 
hypervelocity penetration of some component types
– How much damage can be withstood before the device fails?
– Is any box wall penetration fatal, or is damage more localized?
– Secondary debris damage, possible plasma generation
Wire Bundles RF Waveguides
Avionics Boxes Power Boxes
• Permanent failures are more of a concern than short 
term disturbances
• Testing is needed to characterize these failure criteria
• Most testing requires expensive hypervelocity impact 
testing on representative components, so funding is 
needed
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Conclusions
• There are a variety of research opportunities 
available to support the prevention of new debris
• Most of these opportunities are cost-effective and 
immediately applicable to new designs
• Knowledge from the proposed research can help to 
increase compliance with orbital debris mitigation 
guidelines
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